Continuity, Legitimacy and Identity: Understanding the Romanian August of 1968 by Petrescu, Dragos
 Cuadernos de Historia Contemporánea                                                                                                   
2009, vol. 31, 67-86 
69 
Continuity, Legitimacy and Identity:  
Understanding the Romanian August of 1968 
 
 
Dragoş PETRESCU 
(University of Bucharest) 
dragos.petrescu@fspub.ro 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This paper argues that in order to explain why communist Romania did not take part to the 
crushing of the Prague Spring one should examine the developments in Romanian commu-
nism over the years 1956-1968. Second, the present paper examines the legitimacy issue and 
focuses on perceptions from below of RCP policies in the post-1964 period. The political 
actions taken by the Romanian communists during the period 1964-1968 resulted in positive 
actions expressing consent from the part of large segments of the Romanian society. Third, 
this paper addresses the issue of identity politics under Romanian communism and demon-
strates that the year 1968 marked the transition to a comprehensive nation-building project 
aiming at constructing an ethnically homogenous Romanian “socialist” nation. 
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Continuidad, legitimidad e identidad: Comprendiendo el Agosto 
 rumano de 1968 
 
RESUMEN 
  
El artículo sostiene que para comprender por qué la Rumanía comunista no tomó parte en el 
aplastamiento de la primavera de Praga han de examinarse los hechos ocurridos durante los 
años 1956-1968. En segundo lugar, el estudio examina los problemas de legitimidad y se 
centra en las percepciones desde debajo de las políticas del la República Popular Rumana. 
Las acciones políticas de los comunistas rumanos durante el período 1964-1968 resultaron 
en acciones que expresaban un consenso positivo de parte de grandes sectores de la sociedad 
rumana. En tercer lugar, el artículo se refiere a la política de identidad durante el comunismo 
rumano, demostrando que el año 1968 marcó la transición a un amplio proyecto de cons-
trucción nacional dirigido a la construcción de una nación “socialista” rumana étnicamente 
homogénea. 
 
Palabras clave: Comunismo. Rumanía. 1968. Nacionalismo. 
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When examining the developments in Romanian national-communism during 
the period of Nicolae Ceauşescu (1965-1989), one is compelled to address the 
“charismatic moment” of the supreme leader of the Romanian Communist Party 
(RCP), i.e., his public condemnation of the 1968 Soviet-led military intervention of 
Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) troops in Czechoslovakia. There are many 
reasons for considering the year 1968 as a watershed in the history of Romanian 
communism. The present paper examines three major aspects related to the reaction 
of the communist leadership in Bucharest to the invasion of Czechoslovakia in Au-
gust 1968. 
First, this paper argues that in order to explain why communist Romania did not 
take part to the crushing of the Prague Spring ―the reform movement initiated by 
the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (CPCz), one should examine the develop-
ments in Romanian communism over a longer period of time, i.e., 1956-1968. 
Ceauşescu’s speech of 21 August 1968, in which he condemned in rather strong 
terms the WTO intervention in Czechoslovakia, was perceived as a bold gesture of 
disobedience to the Soviet Union both at home and abroad, and therefore needs a 
thorough examination. At the same time, that gesture has to be analyzed in the lar-
ger context of the post-1956 efforts of the communist elite in Bucharest to emanci-
pate their Party from Moscow. 
Second, the present paper examines the legitimacy issue and focuses on percep-
tions from below of RCP policies in the post-1964 period. The political actions 
taken by the Romanian communists during the period 1964-1968 resulted in posi-
tive actions expressing consent from the part of large segments of the Romanian 
society. Ceauşescu’s refusal to comply with the emerging Brezhnev Doctrine was 
perceived domestically as a commitment to reform communism and thus numerous 
Romanian citizens came to believe that Ceauşescu’s discourse of 21 August 1968 
only marked the beginning of a period of reforms and even more openness towards 
the West. In terms of perceptions from below, it may be argued that on a back-
ground of timid ideological relaxation and slight economic improvement, 
Ceauşescu’s discourse created a special state of mind among the Romanian popula-
tion and brought him a broad popular support, which eventually gave legitimacy to 
the single-Party rule in Romania. 
Third, this paper addresses the issue of identity politics under Romanian com-
munism and demonstrates that the year 1968 marked the transition to a comprehen-
sive nation-building project aiming at constructing an ethnically homogenous Ro-
manian “socialist” nation. To a large extent, Ceauşescu’s chauvinistic nationalism 
developed as a result of the unconditional obedience of the power elite to the su-
preme leader of the RCP and the broad popular support he managed to secure for 
himself that August 1968. 
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Consequences of 1956: “Anti-Soviet Stalinists” faced with De-Stalinization 
 
For a proper understanding of communist Romania’s response to the August 
1968 WTO invasion of Czechoslovakia one should employ a broader perspective 
and discuss first the reaction of the communist elite in Bucharest to the challenges 
posed by the year 1956. Let us examine the developments in Romanian communism 
prior to the year 1968. The communist rule in Romania was imposed “from above 
and abroad”1. The Communist Party in Romania, which numbered some 900-1,000 
members in August 19442, was brought to power by the Soviets and its power was 
consolidated with the full support of the Red Army. The “revolutionary struggle” of 
the Romanian communists did not encompass a “first revolution” on the model of 
the Bolshevik Revolution. Consequently, the Romanian communists were confined 
to carry out solely a “revolution from above,” which represented the major guiding 
principle for the relationship between Party and society from the late 1940s on-
wards. The concept of “revolution from above” is understood in the terms of Robert 
C. Tucker’s analysis of the “second” Soviet revolution of 1928-41. As Tucker puts 
it: “The revolution from above was a state-initiated, state-directed, and state-
enforced process …. State power was the driving force of economic, political, so-
cial, and cultural change that was revolutionary in rapidity of accomplishment, 
forcible methods, and transformative effect.” Tucker also characterized Stalin as a 
“Bolshevik of the radical right, who blended his version of Leninist revolutionism 
with Great Russian nationalism” that coined “the peculiar idea of a forcible revolu-
tion from above as the right formula for socialism in Soviet Russia.”3 
As for the Romanian communists, they proceeded to their “revolution from 
above” by humbly emulating the Soviet model. Simultaneously, a fierce internal 
power struggle was fought during the period 1944-1954 inside the Party. It should 
be emphasized that the factions that were so fiercely fighting for supremacy were 
equally subservient to Moscow, and therefore it was only about which faction 
would achieve supreme power within the Party-State-in-the-making and not about 
conflicting visions of “building socialism” in Romania. Eventually, it was Gheor-
_____________ 
 
1 The term has been used by Connor and Płoszajski when addressing the establishment of Soviet 
type rule in Poland. See CONNOR, Walter D. and PŁOSZAJSKI, Piotr: “Introduction” to Idem, 
(eds.): Escape from Socialism: The Polish Route, Warsaw, IFiS Publishers, 1992, p. 16. 
2 During the period 1948-1965, the official name of the communist party in Romania was Partidul 
Muncitoresc Român – P.M.R. (Romanian Workers Party – RWP); from 1965 to 1989 the official name 
was Partidul Comunist Român – P.C.R. (Romanian Communist Party – RCP). Regarding the fluctuation 
in RCPs membership over the period 1945-1955 and the subsequent steady growth until 1989 see 
IONESCU-GURǍ, Nicoleta: “Introductory Study” to Florica DOBRE et al., (eds.): Membrii C.C. al 
P.C.R., 1945-1989 (Members of the Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party, 1945-1989) 
(Bucharest, Editura Enciclopedică, 2004), 20-22. Hereafter quoted as Members of the CC of the RCP. 
3 See Tucker, Robert C., “Preface” to Idem, Stalin in Power: The Revolution from Above, 1928-
1941, W. W. Norton & Co, New York: 1990, xiv-xv.        
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ghe Gheorghiu-Dej ―once a humble railway worker who did not receive political 
education in the Soviet Union― that managed to silence, or marginalize, his real or 
perceived rivals from within the Party, of whom Ştefan Foriş, Lucreţiu Pǎtrǎşcanu 
and Ana Pauker were the most prominent. True, Gheorghiu-Dej could not succeed 
all alone in the total war for power that was fought within the Party. He relied on 
his “group from prisons,” i.e., a group of communist activists whose loyalty to-
wards Gheorghiu-Dej was due to a significant period of common socialization in 
interwar Romania’s prisons4. Actually, in the aftermath of WWII, the inner circle of 
the communist power in Romania was composed of militants that, beginning in 
1933, stayed in prison together with Gheorghiu-Dej and were part of his “group 
from prisons,” such as Gheorghe Apostol, Emil Bodnăraş, Iosif Chişinevschi, Mi-
ron Constantinescu, Chivu Stoica and Nicolae Ceauşescu. It is important to stress 
that this group has made of monolithism and emancipation of the Party its most 
cherished values, which were transformed into the most enduring features of the 
political culture of Romanian communism after WWII. 
In 1956, the victorious faction, i.e., Gheorghiu-Dej and his group of militants, 
was literally shocked by Nikita Khrushchev’s condemnation of Stalin’s personality 
cult in the front of the 20th Congress of CPSU, and it is understandable why. By that 
time, the Romanian society was already tamed through mass repression and the 
“group from prisons’ was in full control of the Party and the state. At that particular 
moment in time, Gheorghiu-Dej’s personal power was not threatened anymore by 
domestic factors. However, the change of course by the “Moscow center” and the 
condemnation of Stalin’s crimes against Party militants created a totally new politi-
cal context for the relations between Moscow and the Sovietized countries in East-
Central Europe. Up to the moment when Khrushchev gave his secret speech, the 
Kremlin had been the very source of authority for the Romanian communists. De-
Stalinization appeared as an imminent and deadly threat for Gheorghiu-Dej and his 
men, and therefore they had to avoid it at all costs. This called for a rapid adoption 
of a strategy of political survival, and the Romanian communists managed to devise 
one in due time. Such a strategy was based on economic development and return to 
traditional values, as well as on a cautious distancing from Moscow and opening 
towards the West. 
Revolutions are usually unexpected. Nonetheless, the Hungarian Revolution of 
1956 was one of the most unexpected revolutions of the 20th century5. As far as the 
_____________ 
 
4 This author follows Tismăneanu’s conceptualization of the three “centers” of power from within 
the RCP during the WWII period: (1) the underground Central Committee; (2) the center from prisons; 
and (3) the center in Moscow. For a detailed discussion, see TISMǍNEANU, Vladimir: Stalinism for 
All Seasons: A Political History of Romanian Communism, Berkeley, University of California Press, 
2003, pp. 119-125; page numbers are to the Romanian edition (Iaşi, Editura Polirom, 2005). 
5 The syntagm “unexpected revolution” belongs to Paul Kecskemeti. See his The Unexpected 
Revolution: Social Forces in the Hungarian Uprising, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1961. 
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present analysis is concerned, the Hungarian revolution and the temporary demise 
of the communist rule in Romania’s neighboring country affected seriously the po-
litical culture of Romanian communism. At the same time, the Hungarian Revolu-
tion provided an equally unexpected support for Gheorghiu-Dej’s efforts aimed at 
avoiding de-Stalinization and averting losing his grip on power. As numerous ar-
chival sources show, the Romanian communists promptly condemned the “counter-
revolution” and helped in all possible ways the re-establishment of Soviet type rule 
in Hungary6. Romanian communists’ display of loyalty towards the Soviet Union 
paid off wonderfully: the Soviets eventually decided to withdraw their troops from 
Romania, a process that came to an end in the summer of 19587. 
The Plenum of the Central Committee of the Party, held on 28 November-5 De-
cember 1961, was an exercise in adulation of Gheorghiu-Dej’s political skill and 
wisdom. Moreover, the Plenum of November-December 1961 provided what was 
meant to be the definitive official version of Party’s history since the end of WWII. 
It was Gheorghiu-Dej himself who provided first a sketch of this version of Party 
history. In his Report regarding the activity of the Romanian delegation at the 22nd 
Congress of the CPSU, Gheorghiu-Dej condemned Stalin’s personality cult and 
then affirmed that such a personality cult also occurred in Romania. According to 
Gheorghiu-Dej, those responsible for propagating Stalin’s personality cult within 
the ranks of the RCP were Ana Pauker and Vasile Luca (Luca Laszlo):  
 
After their return from the Soviet Union, where they stayed for a long period of 
time, the anti-Party factionalist group Ana Pauker [and] Luca Laszlo, joined after-
wards by Teohari Georgescu, actively helped by Iosif Chişinevschi and Miron Con-
_____________ 
 
6 The Gheorghiu-Dej regime provided full support to the re-establishment of the Soviet-type rule 
in Hungary. Members of the so-called Imre Nagy group were transported to Romania against their will 
and kept under close surveillance by the Romanian Securitate in villas belonging to the RCP in the 
Snagov resort, on the shore of Lake Snagov, outside Bucharest (23 November 1956 – 14 April 1957). 
For more details on the period spent by the Nagy group in Romania, see NAGY, Imre: Însemnări de la 
Snagov: Corespondenţă, rapoarte, convorbiri (Notes from Snagov: Correspondence, reports, talks) 
edited by Ileana Ioanid, Iaşi, Editura Polirom, 2004. For the influence of the Hungarian Revolution on 
the mindset of the Romanian communists elite see PETRESCU, Dragoş: “Fifty-Six as an Identity-
Shaping Experience: The Case of the Romanian Communists,” in János M. RAINER and Katalin 
SOMLAI (eds.): The 1956 Hungarian Revolution and the Soviet Bloc Countries: Reactions and Re-
percussions, The Institute for the History of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution Budapest, 2007, pp. 48-
68. For a chronology of the events in Hungary over the period 1953-1963 see BÉKÉS, Csaba; 
BYRNE, Malcolm; and RAINER, János M (eds.): The 1956 Hungarian revolution: A History in 
Documents, Budapest, CEU Press, 2002, XXXIII-L. 
7 VERONA, Sergiu: Military Occupation and Diplomacy: Soviet Troops in Romania, 1944-1958, 
Duke University Press Durham, 1992, 122-140. For archival documents related to the withdrawal of 
the Soviet troops from Romania see SCURTU, Ioan, ed:, România – Retragerea trupelor sovietice, 
1958 (Romania – The withdrawal of the Soviet troops, 1958), Bucharest, Editura Didactică şi Peda-
gogică, 1996. 
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stantinescu, started to propagate Stalin’s personality cult and introduced in the Party 
life the anti-Leninist methods and practices generated by this cult.8 
 
Thus, according to the said 1961 Plenum, the history of the Party was a struggle 
between two camps: an autochthonous and patriotic one that fought a Soviet-
oriented one. Gheorghiu-Dej claimed that the 1952 purge of the so-called group of 
Ana Pauker, Vasile Luca and Teohari Georgescu, as well as the 1957 purge of the 
so-called faction of Miron Constantinescu and Iosif Chişinevschi, was the result of 
a clash between the proponents of two mutually excluding visions of Party-State 
politics. The local and patriotic group, which was led by Gheorghiu-Dej himself, 
had a single scope: that of serving Romania’s national interests. This group was 
opposed from the outset by a so-called Muscovite group, which served solely the 
interests of the Soviet Union. Fortunately ―the argument further read― it was the 
patriotic faction led by Gheorghiu-Dej that won the battle. The truth is that both 
factions were equally Stalinist and obedient to the Kremlin. For instance, in the con-
text of the Tito-Stalin split, it was Gheorghiu-Dej who at the Third Meeting of the 
Cominform (Budapest, 16-19 November 1949) presented the report entitled Par-
tidul Comunist din Iugoslavia în mîna unor asasini şi spioni (The Communist Party 
of Yugoslavia in the hands of certain assassins and spies)9. 
In 1964, three years after that carefully staged Party Plenum, it was issued one of 
the most important Party documents devised under Gheorghiu-Dej’s leadership and 
arguably one of the most relevant documents of Romanian communism. Generally 
known as the “Declaration of April 1964,” the said document proclaimed that all 
communist parties were equal within the international communist movement and 
thus they were free to choose their own path towards “socialism.” A phrase from 
the 1964 Declaration is particularly telling with regard to the emancipating strategy 
of the Romanian communist elite: “There exists no “parent” party and “offspring” 
party, “superior” and “subordinated” parties, but only the large family of commu-
nist and workers parties having equal rights”10. Gheorghiu-Dej, however, did not 
_____________ 
 
8 See “Stenograma şedinţei Plenare lărgite a C.C. al P.M.R. din zilele de 30 noiembrie – 5 de-
cembrie 1961” (Minutes of the enlarged Plenum of the CC of the RWP of 30 November – 5 December 
1961) in NEAGOE-PLEŞA, Elis and Liviu PLEŞA, (eds.): Dosarul Ana Pauker: Plenara Comitetului 
Central al Partidului Muncitoresc Român din 30 noiembrie – 5 decembrie 1961, Vol. 1 (The Ana 
Pauker file: The Plenum of the CC of RWP of 30 November – 5 December 1961), Bucharest, Editura 
Nemira, 2006, 153.   
9 For a collection of documents related to the position of communist Romania with regard to the 
Tito-Stalin split, see CONSTANTINIU, Florin and Adrian POP, (eds.): Schisma roşie: România şi 
declanşarea conflictului sovieto-iugoslav, 1948-1950 (The red schism: Romania and the breaking out 
of the Soviet-Yugoslav conflict, 1948-1950), Bucharest, Editura Compania, 2007.  
10 See Declaraţie cu privire la poziţia Partidului Muncitoresc Român în problemele mişcării 
comuniste şi muncitoreşti internaţionale, adoptată de Plenara lărgită a C.C. al P.M.R. din aprilie 
1964 (Declaration concerning the position of the Romanian Workers’ Party with regard to the prob-
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live long enough to enjoy the benefits of the independent-path policies he initiated 
in order to block the de-Stalinization of Romania: he died of a galloping cancer in 
March 1965. 
Quite surprisingly, it was Ceauşescu the one who became the successor of Gheor-
ghiu-Dej and not one of the Party elders. In this regard, post-1989 testimonies by 
former nomenklatura members seem to agree that Ceauşescu managed to convince 
the most influential members of the power elite, especially Ion Gheorghe Maurer, that 
he would be a staunch continuator of the “national line” initiated by Dej11. Once in 
power, Ceauşescu did follow Gheorghiu-Dej policies of industrial development and 
independence from Moscow. At the same time, he was determined to consolidate his 
power and employed the Khrushchevite strategy of condemning officially the abuses 
committed by his predecessor against the Party apparatus. 
After a period of “collective leadership,” i.e., March 1965-April 1968, 
Ceauşescu thoroughly staged a Plenum of the Central Committee of the RCP, which 
was held on 22-25 April 196812. A key moment of the Plenum was the adoption of 
the “Decision of the CC of the RCP regarding the rehabilitation of a number of 
Party activists.” This decision epitomizes Romania’s belated and short-lived de-
Stalinization, which lasted from April 1968 to July 1971. The Decision of April 
1968 was structured on six points that were in fact six indictments of Gheorghiu-
Dej’s policies concerning the Party apparatus: (1) the “post-mortem political reha-
bilitation” of Lucreţiu Pătrăşcanu; (2) the “post-mortem political rehabilitation” of 
Ştefan Foriş; (3) the “post-mortem political rehabilitation” of a number of nineteen 
other former Party activists; (4) the revoking of the Party sanctions issued against 
eight Party members: Miron Constantinescu, Ion Craiu, Ioan Demeter, Constantin 
Doncea, Mihai Levente, Vasile Modoran, Dumitru Petrescu and Aurel Vijoli; (5) 
the promise that similar cases of other old-timers would be analyzed; and (6) the 
decision to dismiss Alexandru Drăghici [former head of the Securitate] from the CC 
of the RCP and to establish the responsibility of those involved in “illegal repres-
sive actions” in order to punish them13. The importance of the Plenum of April 1968 
is twofold. First, it marked the beginning of the official, although belated, de-
_____________ 
 
lems of the international communist and workers’ movement adopted by the enlarged Plenum of the 
CC of the RWP of April 1964), Bucharest, Editura Politică, 1964, p. 55. 
11 See, in this respect, the testimony of MAURER, Ion Gheorghe in BETEA, Lavinia: Maurer şi 
lumea de ieri: Mărturii despre stalinizarea României (Maurer and the yesterday world: Testimonies 
on Romania’s Stalinization), Arad, Editura Ioan Slavici, 1995, pp.172-77. For more on the prominent 
political career of Maurer, see DOBRE et al., eds., Members of the CC of the RCP, p. 385. 
12 Plenara Comitetului Central al Partidului Comunist Român din 22-25 aprilie 1968 (The Ple-
num of the CC of the RCP of 22-25 April 1968), Bucharest, Editura Politică, 1968. Hereafter quoted 
as The Plenum of the CC of the RCP of 22-25 April 1968. 
13 See Hotărîrea C.C. al P.C.R. cu privire la reabilitarea unor activişti de partid (The decision of 
the CC of the RCP regarding the rehabilitation of a number of Party activists), in The Plenum of the 
CC of the RCP of 22-25 April 1968, 64-76. 
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Stalinization in Romania. True, in the case of Romania de-Stalinization proved to 
be extremely superficial: it hardly went beyond Ceauşescu’s repudiation of Gheor-
ghiu-Dej’s political legacy and came abruptly to an end through the issuance of the 
so-called “Theses of July 1971”. Second, it had a major impact on the Party and the 
Securitate: it showed that the period of “collective leadership” was over and that 
Ceauşescu had become the undisputed leader of the Party and the one whom the 
Securitate had to obey absolutely. Nonetheless, Ceauşescu’s major achievement in 
terms of domestic support for his rule was yet to come: the “charismatic” moment 
that conferred almost overnight legitimacy to the communist rule in Romania. 
To sum up, the policy of emancipating the RCP from the CPSU was a constant 
preoccupation of the communist elite in Bucharest in the post-1956 period and be-
came one of the most salient features of the political culture of Romanian national-
communism. Thus, the strategy of political survival aimed at averting de-
Stalinization made of the independent-path policy a pivotal political principle of the 
late Gheorghiu-Dej regime. Ceauşescu followed unabatedly this principle, although 
he repudiated in April 1968, in a Khrushchevite manner, the abuses of his predeces-
sor against some Party members. As shown below, Ceauşescu had no intention 
whatsoever to introduce reforms on the Prague Spring model. His only concern was 
to assert the right of each and every communist party to choose its own way of 
“building socialism,” without any interference from the part of the Soviet Union or 
other states. 
 
 
Ceauşescu, the Prague Spring, and Home Affairs 
 
Ceauşescu’s condemnation of the crushing of the Prague Spring and his subse-
quent rejection of the Brezhnev Doctrine were interpreted as a display of reformist 
stances. However, Ceauşescu and the RCP supported solely the right of the Com-
munist Party of Czechoslovakia (CPCz) to pursue its own path towards “socialism,” 
and by no means the reform program of CPCz. Throughout the period January-
August 1968, the reform process that unfolded in former Czechoslovakia was pre-
sented to the Romanian public as a version of the independent-path policies com-
munist Romania was engaged in. Not a single reference was made to the signifi-
cance of the reforms introduced by the regime of Alexander Dubček and nothing 
was said about the way the Czecho-Slovak society at large reacted to the reforms 
initiated from above, from the top of the CPCz. 
In February 1968, an official delegation of the RCP went to Prague and partici-
pated to the festivities occasioned by the 20th anniversary of the February 1948 coup 
that brought the communists in power in postwar Czechoslovakia. On 22 February, in 
his speech, Ceauşescu referred to the “unshakeable alliance” between the two “social-
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ist states” and to the need to strengthen the “cohesion of the international working-
class movement”14. It is quite difficult to find out what the leadership in Bucharest 
really thought about the reforms initiated by the CPCz. Ceauşescu officially ex-
pressed in Prague his trust in the CPCz, “headed by its First Secretary, comrade Alex-
ander Dubček.” However, according to Dumitru Popescu, the RCP chief ideologue, 
Ceauşescu expressed unofficially his doubts with regard to the person of Dubček, 
whom he considered far too lenient and “lacking a clear and firm personal stance”15. 
No matter what were Ceauşescu’s personal opinions about Dubček, it seems that as 
early as February 1968 the RCP has warned the Soviets that it would not support 
them in the case of a conflict with the new leadership of CPCz. This information was 
provided by a former Romanian top Party official, Paul Niculescu-Mizil, in one of his 
book of memoirs. According to Niculescu-Mizil, the RCP made clear to the Soviet 
leadership that: “They cannot count on us in the likelihood of a conflict with the de-
mocratic line of the Czechoslovaks”16. 
For ordinary Romanians, it was clear that something was happening in Czechoslo-
vakia and that the Romanian communists were supportive of CPCz’s initiatives. The 
Party newspaper Scînteia wrote constantly about the changes that were taking place in 
Czechoslovakia. However, no reference was made to official documents of crucial 
importance, such as the Action Program of the Central Committee of the Communist 
Party of Czechoslovakia (10 April 1968), which could indicate to a large extent the 
direction of the reforms envisaged by CPCz. Furthermore, nothing was said about the 
reaction of the Czechoslovak society in general to the reforms introduced from above. 
For instance, it is worth mentioning that the “Two Thousand Words” manifesto (27 
June 1968) was not commented by the Romanian press17. 
_____________ 
 
14 CEAUŞESCU, Nicolae: “Cuvînt de salut la festivităţile de la Praga consacrate celei de-a 20-a 
aniversări a victoriei oamenilor muncii din Cehoslovacia din februarie 1948” (Greeting speech at the 
festivities dedicated to the 20th  anniversary of the victory of the working people of Czechoslovakia of 
February 1948) in Idem, România pe drumul desăvîrşirii construcţiei socialiste: Rapoarte, cuvîntări, 
articole: ianuarie 1968-martie 1969 (Romania on the road towards completing the building of social-
ism: Reports, speeches, articles: January 1968-March 1969), Bucharest, Editura Politică, 1969, pp. 80-
84. Hereafter quoted as Reports, speeches, articles: January 1968 -March 1969. 
15 See POPESCU, Dumitru: Un fost lider comunist se destăinuie: “Am fost şi cioplitor de himere” 
(A former communist leader confesses: “I was also a carver of chimeras”), Bucharest, Editura Expres, 
p. 142. For more on the political biography of Dumitru Popescu, nicknamed “Dumnezeu,” i.e., “the 
Almighty,” see DOBRE et al. (eds.): Members of the CC of the RCP, pp. 480-81. 
16 NICULESCU-MIZIL, Paul: De la Comintern la comunism naţional: Despre Consfătuirea par-
tidelor comuniste şi muncitoreşti, Moscova, 1969 (From Comintern to national communism: On the 
Meeting of communist and workers parties, Moscow, 1969), Bucharest, Editura Evenimentul 
Românesc, 2001, p. 174. On the political career of Niculescu-Mizil, see DOBRE et al. (eds.): Mem-
bers of the CC of the RCP, pp. 432-33. 
17 For a collection of documents related to the Prague Spring and its suppression by the Soviet-led in-
tervention see NAVRÁTIL, Jaromír et al. (eds): The Prague Spring 1968, Budapest, CEU Press, 1998. 
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At the same time, documents from the archive of the Romanian Ministry of For-
eign Affairs indicate that the Romanian embassy in Prague was sending to Bucha-
rest timely and comprehensive reports on the pace of changes in Czechoslovakia. 
Therefore, it may be argued that Ceauşescu was well informed about the situation in 
Prague. For instance, in a telegram sent to Bucharest on 23 March 1968 it was men-
tioned that among Czechoslovak students there were signaled “inappropriate mani-
festations” such as requests for renouncing to the leading role of the CPCz, hostile 
statements concerning the army or wishes that Czechoslovakia would pursue a pol-
icy of neutrality18. The Romanian diplomats in Prague did identify, and correctly 
informed Bucharest about, a crucial aspect of the Prague Spring: the fact that the 
reforms initiated from above resulted in an unprecedented mobilization of the intel-
lectual circles in Prague. 
Time and again, in his public interventions Ceauşescu presented the situation in 
Czechoslovakia as mirroring the one in Romania. Thus, ordinary Romanians were 
told that the Czechoslovak communists, supported by a majority of the population, 
were determined to pursue their own, independent path towards “socialism” and 
that the communist parties of Bulgaria, Hungary, East Germany, Poland and Soviet 
Union were not quite happy with that. Beginning in mid-July, however, Ceauşescu 
referred constantly to the situation in Czechoslovakia and stressed consistently that 
the CPCz had the right to decide by itself upon its way of building “socialism.” 
These ideas were expressed on 15 July, during his visit to the Galaţi Steel Com-
bine19, on 11 August, at the celebration of Miner’s Day (Ziua minerului) and the 
Hundredth Anniversary of the establishment of mining industry in the Jiu Valley20. 
On 14 August, Ceauşescu took part to the graduation ceremony at the Military 
Academy and put forward his views about national armed forces and their role 
within the Warsaw Treaty Organization framework: “The solving of domestic prob-
lems belongs exclusively to the party and people of each country and any kind of 
interference can only do harm to the cause of socialism, friendship and collabora-
tion among the socialist countries”21. 
_____________ 
 
18 RETEGAN, Mihai: 1968 – Din primăvară pînă în toamnă: Schiţă de politică externă românea-
scă (1968 – From spring till autumn: An outline of Romanian foreign policy), Bucharest, Editura 
RAO, 1998, pp. 96-97. 
19 CEAUŞESCU: “Cuvîntare la mitingul de la Combinatul siderurgic din Galaţi – 15 iulie 1968” 
(Speech delivered at the meeting at the Galaţi Steel Combine – 15 July 1968) in Idem, Reports, 
speeches, articles: January 1968 – March 1969, pp. 327-328. 
20 CEAUŞESCU: “Cuvîntare la sărbătorirea Zilei minerului şi a Centenarului industriei carbon-
ifere din Valea Jiului – 11 august 1968” (Speech delivered to the celebration of Miner’s Day and the 
Hundredth Anniversary of the establishment of the mining industry in the Jiu Valley) in Idem, Re-
ports, speeches, articles: January 1968 – March 1969, pp. 353-355.   
21 CEAUŞESCU: “Cuvîntare la Adunarea festivă din Capitală cu prilejul absolvirii promoţiei 1968 a 
Academiei Militare Generale şi acordării gradului de ofiţer absolvenţilor şcolilor militare – 14 august 
1968” (Speech delivered at the Bucharest festive meeting occasioned by the graduation of the 1968 con-
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Finally, a Romanian delegation led by Ceauşescu himself visited Prague during 
the period 15-17 August. On 16 August, during a visit to the Avia plant, Ceauşescu 
reiterated that the RCP was fully supporting the CPCz: “As dear friends and com-
rades, we wish you to completely succeed in your efforts towards the multilaterally 
development of socialist Czechoslovakia and we assure you with this occasion of the 
solidarity and the fraternal internationalist support of Romanian communists and the 
entire Romanian people”22. The same day, 16 August, it was signed the “Treaty of 
friendship, cooperation and mutual assistance between the Socialist Republic of Ro-
mania and the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic” (Tratatul de prietenie, colaborare şi 
asistenţă mutuală dintre Republica Socialistă România şi Republica Socialistă Ceho-
slovacă). Ceauşescu took the opportunity to express once more his support for the 
course pursued by the Czech and Slovak communists23. Ceauşescu spoke again about 
the RCP’s full support of CPCz on 20 August, when he inaugurated the Piteşti Auto-
mobile Plant (Uzina de autoturisme Piteşti), the producer of the most popular car in 
Romania, Dacia. The following fragment of his speech is telling: 
  
During the visit … we could observe with complete satisfaction that the CPCz, its 
leadership, the Czechoslovak government, the working class, Czechoslovak peas-
antry, the intellectuals, the entire people, are unabatedly putting into practice the 
Party policy of building socialism and of developing Czechoslovakia on the path 
of socialism…. We have been profoundly impressed. We have returned with an 
even stronger conviction that the destinies of socialism and of Czechoslovak peo-
ple are in safe hands, in the hands of the communist party and of its leadership.24 
 
The fact that the supreme leader of the RCP was ready to bear witness that the “des-
tinies of socialism and the Czechoslovak people” stayed firmly in safe hands could not 
change the course of events. On the night of 20 to 21 August 1968, WTO troops under 
Soviet command invaded Czechoslovakia and put an end to the Prague Spring.    
 
 
_____________ 
 
tingent of the Military Academy and conferring the rank of officer to the graduates of military schools – 
14 August 1968) in Idem, Reports, speeches, articles: January 1968 – March 1969, pp. 365-366. 
22 CEAUŞESCU: “Cuvîntare la mitingul de la uzinele Avia din Praga – 16 august 1968” (Speech 
delivered to the rally at the Avia plant in Prague – 16 August 1968) in Idem, Reports, speeches, arti-
cles: January 1968 – March 1969, pp. 385-386. 
23 CEAUŞESCU: “Cuvîntare la solemnitatea semnării Tratatului de prietenie, colaborare şi asis-
tenţă mutuală între Republica Socialistă România şi Republica Socialistă Cehoslovacă – 16 august 
1968” (Speech delivered to the ceremony of signing the Treaty of friendship, cooperation and mutual 
assistance between the Socialist Republic of Romania and the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic) in 
Idem, Reports, speeches, articles: January 1968 – March 1969, pp. 391-395. 
24 CEAUŞESCU: “Cuvîntare la mitingul organizat la inaugurarea Uzinei de autoturisme Piteşti – 20 
august 1968” (Speech delivered at the rally occasioned by the inauguration of the Piteşti Automobile 
Enterprise) in Idem, Reports, speeches, articles: January 1968 – March 1969, pp. 411-412. 
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The Legitimacy Issue 
 
On 21 August 1968, from the balcony of the building of CC of the RCP, Nicolae 
Ceauşescu addressed the crowds gathered in front of the building. A first thing to 
say about his discourse is that it was highly patriotic and a majority of the popula-
tion perceived in it strong anti-Soviet accents. Many came to believe that 
Ceauşescu’s discourse marked only the beginning of a period of bold reforms. Wit-
ness accounts speak of a particular state of mind among large segments of the popu-
lation, which seemed to forget about the open wounds of the past two decades of 
single party rule in Romania: 
 
The incursion in Czechoslovakia of the troops belonging to the five socialist 
countries represents a big mistake and a serious threat to peace in Europe and for 
the destiny of socialism in the world. It is inconceivable in the present day world 
– when peoples rise to defend their national independence and for equal rights – 
that a socialist state, that socialist states to infringe on the liberty and independ-
ence of another state. There can be no excuse, and there can be no reason to ac-
cept, even for a single moment, the idea of a military intervention in the domestic 
affairs of a fraternal socialist state.25  
 
During the period March 1965-August 1968, regime perceptions from below 
improved gradually due to Ceauşescu’s foreign policy of independence from Mos-
cow and opening towards the West, as well as due to his domestic policies of rela-
tive economic and ideological relaxation. The slight improvement of the standard of 
living of the population found an echo in the hearts and minds of a majority of Ro-
mania’s population. Thus, in August 1968 ―ten years after the withdrawal of So-
viet troops from Romania― when Ceauşescu gave his famous “balcony speech” in 
which he condemned the invasion of Czechoslovakia by WTO troops, an over-
whelming majority of the population supported him without hesitation. The effect 
of Ceauşescu’s discourse on Romania’s population at large was enormous. In fact, 
that speech represented for many Romanians the “proof” of Ceauşescu’s charis-
matic qualifications26. One can go further and argue that Ceauşescu’s “charismatic 
leadership,” to use Reinhard Bendix’s concept, occurred in the dramatic conditions 
_____________ 
 
25 Ceauşescu’s speech of 21 August 1968 was published by the Party daily Scînteia No. 7802 
(Thursday, 22 august 1968), 1. The speech was also published in Ceauşescu, Reports, speeches, arti-
cles, January 1968 – March 1969, 415-418. 
26 According to Max Weber, charisma is: “A certain quality of an individual personality by virtue 
of which he is set apart from ordinary men and treated as endowed with supernatural, superhuman, or 
at least specifically exceptional powers or qualities”. Quoted in BENDIX, “Reflections on Charismatic 
Leadership,” in BENDIX, Reinhard et al. (eds.): State and Society: A Reader in Comparative Sociol-
ogy, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1973, p. 619. 
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of that August 196827. However, as David Beetham correctly observed, the use We-
berian concept of “charismatic authority” is problematic in the sense that it “assigns 
far too exclusive an importance to the individual, and leads to fruitless, because un-
resolvable, disputes about whether particular leaders possess the indefinable quality 
of ‘charisma’ or not”28. 
In order to understand the mechanism that provided the Ceauşescu regime with 
unprecedented mobilizing capacity one should address two major issues: (1) 
Ceauşescu’s personality and leadership style; and (2) the particular circumstances in 
which popular mobilization occurred. With regard to Ceauşescu’s personality and 
leadership style, one has to mention that he was by far less flexible in adopting 
various policies than his predecessor, Gheorghiu-Dej. He was also less imaginative 
and his ideological commitment to the main tenets of Marxism-Leninism remained 
strong. Nonetheless, he was only 47 when he became secretary general of the RCP 
and managed to build a positive image of himself as a “man of the people” by pro-
ceeding consistently to grassroots consultations. During the period 1965-1968, 
Ceauşescu’s domestic visits were carefully staged and in many instances he also 
visited the most relevant historic monuments in the respective area, thus paying re-
spect to the deeds of the ancestors with an emphasis on the medieval rulers of Ro-
manian principalities. This was in sharp contrast with the leadership style of his 
predecessor, Gheorghiu-Dej, who did not champion such staged domestic visits.  
As shown above, Ceauşescu successfully launched a belated and short lived de-
Stalinization with the only scope of unmasking the wrongdoings of Gheorghiu-Dej 
and repudiating his political legacy. The mobilizing power of Ceauşescu’s actions 
resided in his policy of independence from Moscow and opening toward the West. 
However, it was Gheorghiu-Dej who initiated the strategy of independence-cum-
industrialization and put forward the principles for emancipating the Party, which 
stayed later on at the basis of the Declaration of April 1964. Therefore, one can ar-
gue that Ceauşescu benefited in many respects from the national line inaugurated by 
Gheorghiu-Dej. 
As for Ceauşescu’s bold stance at the news of the WTO intervention in Czecho-
slovakia, one should mention the opinion of a member of the communist power 
elite of the time. Alexandru Bîrlădeanu, a prominent nomenklatura member, pointed 
out in a post-1989 book-length interview to a particular trait of Ceauşescu’s charac-
ter: when talking to a crowd he used to get excited and speak more than necessary. 
According to Bîrlădeanu, this happened more than once and this was also the case 
with Ceauşescu’s discourse of 21 August 1968. As he put it: “After you get out in 
the open in front of a tiger, it is not the right moment to pull it by its tail. This is 
_____________ 
 
27 For more on this see BENDIX: “Reflections on Charismatic Leadership”, pp. 616-29. 
28 BEETHAM, David: The Legitimation of Power, London, Macmillan, 1991, p. 156. 
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what Ceauşescu did. Nevertheless, it worked very well with the people, who were 
deeply impressed”29. 
Let us turn to some recollections by persons who became later on dissidents or 
fierce political opponents of the supreme leader of the RCP, which are particularly 
telling. Writer Paul Goma, the initiator of the 1977 Goma movement for human 
rights and perhaps the most famous Romanian dissident wrote in August 1985 a 
perceptive article entitled “August ’68” in which he recalled the “hysterical atmos-
phere” of those days. Goma correctly points out that it was not Romanians’ special 
sympathy for the Czechs and Slovaks that mobilized the crowds in Bucharest. As he 
puts it: 
 
We were not necessarily friends, nor were we foes [of the Czechs] – we had had 
nothing to quarrel about. After all, what did we know, then, about the Czechs? 
That they occupied the most Sovietophile “barrack” in the whole Camp … [and] 
together with the East Germans, the Czechs had been the most hostile to the Ro-
manians, disapproving their industrialization drive and inviting them to stick to 
agriculture and shepherding.30 
 
Thus, Goma suggests that it was rather the fact that the Soviets dared to invade a 
“fraternal country” that created a special state of mind among the population of Ro-
mania. In this respect, he stressed the mobilizing power of Ceauşescu’s discourse of 
21 August: 
 
Ceauşescu’s discourse, from the balcony… Even now, in 1985, I cannot say that 
at that moment he “acted” as well, that he was insincere.… Then, Ceauşescu ap-
pealed not to communists, but to citizens; to defend, not the Party, but the coun-
try. By the power of arms. Of course, none of us did imagine that we would de-
feat the terrible Red Army. Each and every one of us asked ourselves how many 
hours we would resist. And even if that time span was to be counted in minutes, it 
would have meant nonetheless something [original emphasis].31 
 
Journalist Neculai Constantin Munteanu became one of the most acerbic critics 
of Ceauşescu’s dictatorship as part of the Romanian desk of Radio Free Europe dur-
ing the 1980s. In a 1977 letter addressed to Ceauşescu, in which he put forward the 
main reasons that made him decide to leave Romania for ever, he also referred to 
the strong impression Ceauşescu’s discourse of 21 August 1968 made on him: “In 
_____________ 
 
29 See BETEA, Lavinia: Alexandru Bîrlădeanu despre Dej, Ceauşescu şi Iliescu: Convorbiri (Al-
exandru Bîrlădeanu on Dej, Ceauşescu and Iliescu: Conversations), Bucharest, Editura Evenimentul 
Românesc, 1998, p. 191. For details on Bîrlădeanu’s political career, see Dobre et al., eds., Members 
of the CC of the RCP, pp. 92-93.   
30 GOMA, Paul: Amnezia la români (Amnezia to Romanians), Bucharest, Editura Litera, 1992, pp. 53-54. 
31 Ibid., 54. 
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August 1968 I was among the thousands of Romanians who listened to you speaking 
from the balcony of the CC of the RCP. The vehemence of your condemnation of the 
armed aggression of some member countries of the WTO against a friendly and allied 
country made me feel proud of being a Romanian [emphasis added]”32. In the same 
vein, writer Dumitru Ţepeneag remembers that Ceauşescu’s discourse had an instan-
taneous effect on him: “For some days, I was a convinced Ceauşescuist”33.   
There were in fact some simple themes, such as the struggle for independence 
and return to traditional values that found an echo in the minds and heats of a ma-
jority of the Romanian population. At the same time, there were some things that 
people could experience on an everyday basis such as: a cautious ideological re-
laxation, a slight improvement of the living standards and an opening towards the 
West. In 1968, things seemed to move in the right direction, and many felt that RCP 
leadership was taking action to improve their situation. Testimonies by Romanian 
émigrés are also telling. In her book of memoirs, Sanda Stolojan, the official inter-
preter of the French president Charles de Gaulle during his official visit to Romania 
(14-18 May 1968), speaks convincingly of the sense of hope the population experi-
enced in those days. Her account, coming from a critical émigré intellectual is all 
the more remarkable: “In spite of poverty and cramming, the houses, churches, 
streets were not yet disfigured or destroyed. The heart of the city continued to beat. 
Hope was in the air, I could feel it that month in 1968 beyond the pallid faces and 
damaged façades”34. 
Such a widespread positive perception of the regime permitted the RCP to 
achieve a “limited legitimation through consent”35. Ceauşescu’s political gesture of 
condemning the Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia conferred almost overnight 
legitimacy on the single Party rule in Romania. Moreover, the “balcony speech,” 
which was generally perceived as a “proof” of Ceauşescu’s charismatic qualifica-
tions, was given at the beginnings of his rule and thus contributed heavily in con-
solidating his power. This considerably delayed the emergence of critical stances 
against Ceauşescu’s increasingly personalized rule in the following years. 
 
 
 
 
_____________ 
 
32 MUNTEANU, Neculai Constantin: Ultimii şapte ani de-acasă: Un ziarist în dosarele Securităţii 
(The last seven years at home: A journalist in the files of the Securitate), Veche, Bucharest, Editura 
Curtea, 2007, p. 120. 
33 See ŢEPENEAG, Dumitru: Reîntoarcerea fiului la sînul mamei rătăcite (The return of the son 
to prodigal mother’s breast), Iaşi, Institutul European, 1993, p. 95. 
34 STOLOJAN, Sanda: Cu de Gaulle în România (With de Gaulle in Romania), Bucharest,  Editu-
ra Albatros, 1994, p. 36. 
35 BEETHAM: The Legitimation of Power, p. 117. 
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Identity Politics 
 
Under Ceauşescu’s rule, the RCP engaged in a sustained policy of reinforcing 
the ethnic ties among the Romanian majority and assimilating the historic ethnic 
minorities. As shown above, Gheorghiu-Dej initiated after 1956 a strategy of avert-
ing de-Stalinization based on industrialization and independence from Moscow, 
which entailed a return to the local traditions and thus to an ethnic understanding of 
the nation. Ceauşescu’s predecessor, who applied random terror in order to So-
vietize the country, only managed to engage in process of “selective community 
building,” aimed at building a political consensus and give a new meaning to rela-
tions between the communist elite and the population at large36. 
While striving to preserve power and prevent de-Stalinization, the Romanian 
communist elite headed by Gheorghiu-Dej discovered that national identity is a cru-
cial social and political resource and made use of it in order to ensure their political 
survival. The Romanian Stalinists, however, were not familiar with the language of 
nationalism and it took them some eight years (1956-1964) to understand fully the 
extraordinary force of nationalism as an instrument for preserving their absolute 
power. It was only from 1964 onwards that the process of building selectively a po-
litical community was turned into an all-encompassing nation-building process. In 
1964, the political prisoners were eventually liberated. Since no major segments of 
the population were left out anymore, it seemed that the preconditions for engaging 
in a comprehensive, “socialist” nation-building project were set. But the consent of 
the ruled was still missing. Gheorghiu-Dej tamed the society through random terror, 
then distanced himself from Moscow and returned to traditional values in order to 
avoid de-Stalinization. In 1964, a “declaration of independence” was issued and the 
political prisoners were liberated, but the RCP had a legitimacy problem, which was 
solved only in August 1968. 
As John Breuilly perceptively points out: “Nationalism is, above and beyond all 
else, about politics and … politics is about power. Power, in the modern world, is 
principally about control of the state”37. The societal response to Ceauşescu’s 
speech of 21 August 1968 made clear that nationalism was a most powerful politi-
cal principle that conferred legitimacy on the RCP rule in Romania. From that mo-
ment on, the RCP propaganda machine started to put a much stronger emphasis on 
ancestors’ struggle for independence and their heroic deeds. As George Schöpflin 
aptly puts it:  
 
_____________ 
 
36 See JOWITT, Kenneth: Revolutionary Breakthroughs and National Development: The Case of 
Romania, 1944-1965, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1971, p. 74. 
37 BREUILLY, John: Nationalism and the State, 2nd ed., Chicago, The University of Chicago 
Press, 1994, 1.   
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Culture embodies a variety of myths … giving a collectivity a choice of which 
myth to engage in different circumstances…. What the analysis of myths suggests 
is that politics is an aspect of the overall cultural system. Every political action is 
embedded in a wider cultural context…. Mythic and symbolic discourses can thus 
be employed to assert legitimacy and strengthen authority. They mobilize emo-
tions and enthusiasm. They are a primary means by which people make sense of 
the political process, which is understood in a symbolic form. Attitudes are, there-
fore, formed more by symbolic forms than utilitarian calculation, and the potency 
of symbols in the political process derives from the fact that they are vehicles for 
conceptualization.38 
 
In Ceauşescu’s Romania, historians co-opted by the propaganda machine de-
vised an official version of “national” history centered on the four fundamental his-
torical myths of the Romanians: (1) ancient roots; (2) continuity on the present day 
territory; (3) unity and (4) struggle for independence. Ancient roots and continuity 
referred to the ethnic origins of the nation and the related disputes with historians 
from neighboring Hungary with regard to the contested region of Transylvania, 
considered as a cradle of their nation by both Romanians and Hungarians. Unity and 
independence, however, were intrinsically linked to the RCP policies from 1956 
onwards. It was the unity of the Party and the independence from Moscow that 
permitted the Stalinist elite in Romania to survive de-Stalinization. Therefore, a 
transfer of such a vision to the Party-State level came almost naturally and was very 
effective as a propaganda instrument. The medieval rulers of the Romanian princi-
palities had to defend their independence by fighting against the Ottomans; the rul-
ers of communist Romania had to oppose the Soviets in order to preserve the inde-
pendence of their “socialist” nation-state.  
For his part, Ceauşescu wanted to win a place for himself in the heroic tradition 
of the medieval rulers of the three Romanian Principalities (Wallachia, Moldavia 
and Transylvania). A former nomenklatura member, Cornel Burtică, states that 
Ceauşescu was truly interested in the history of Romania and fascinated by the rul-
ers of the Romanian Principalities, from a distant past to the modern period: “One 
has to follow Ceauşescu’s tenacity … and his long term action in order to gradually 
become the absolute ruler of Romania, being convinced that he was the descendant 
of our great forefathers – Decebal, Ştefan cel Mare [Stephen the Great], Mircea cel 
Bătrîn [Mircea the Old], Mihai Viteazul [Michael the Brave], Alexandru Ioan Cuza 
– and was carrying further Romania’s glory”39. As already mentioned, from the 
_____________ 
 
38 SCHÖPFLIN, George: Nations, Identity, Power: The New Politics of Europe, London, Hurst, 
2000, pp. 88-89. 
39 See CHELARU, Rodica: Culpe care nu se uită: Convorbiri cu Cornel Burtică (Misdeeds one 
cannot forget: Conversations with Cornel Burtică), Bucharest, Editura Curtea Veche, 2001, p. 79. Cor-
nel Burtică, was a member of the CC of the RCP (1969-1982) and of the Executive Political Commit-
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very beginnings of his rule Ceauşescu manifested his appreciation for the heroic 
deeds of those medieval rulers and his leadership style was based on a systematic 
program of domestic visits40. Moreover, it was under Ceauşescu that the myth of 
Mihai Viteazul, the ruler that realized a short-lived unification of the three princi-
palities under his scepter in 1600, was revived. Thus, in 1969, it was started the 
production of the movie, also entitled Mihai Viteazul, directed by Sergiu 
Nicolaescu. Released in 1971, the movie proved to be the most watched historical 
Romanian film production of all time, and the third most watched Romanian movie 
of all time. Mihai Viteazul epitomized the historical myths of unity and independ-
ence, while a previous movie by Nicolaescu, Dacii (The Dacians), released in 1967, 
concentrated on ancient roots and continuity, and alluded to the Roman conquest of 
the Dacian kingdom and the formation of the Romanian people as a Dacian-Roman 
synthesis. Dacii was Nicolaescu’s first big success and ranks second after Mihai 
Viteazul in the hierarchy of the most watched Romanian historical movies and 
fourth in the national rankings of the most watched movies of all time41. With re-
gard to the revival of historical myths in order to popular support for the RCP rule, 
it should be mentioned that beginning on 26 August, Ceauşescu engaged in an am-
ple program of domestic visits. Among the numerous mass rallies organized 
throughout the country, one is particularly important: the rally held on 30 August 
1968 in the Transylvanian city of Cluj. That day, Ceauşescu delivered a flamboyant 
speech in front of a numerous audience in which he referred for the first time to the 
RCP as the direct continuator of the heroic deeds of the Romanian medieval rulers 
such as Ştefan cel Mare, Mircea cel Bătrîn or Mihai Viteazul42. From September 
1968 onwards, the emphasis on independence and unity, as well as the cult of an-
_____________ 
 
tee of CC of the RCP (1974-1982). For more on his political career see DOBRE et al. (eds.): Members 
of the CC of the RCP, pp. 121-22. 
40 PETRESCU, Cristina: “Vizitele de lucru, un ritual al Epocii de aur” ([Ceauşescu’s] Domestic 
visits, a ritual of the Golden Epoch), in: Lucian BOIA (ed.): Miturile comunismului românesc (Myths 
of Romanian communism), Bucharest, Editura Nemira, 1998, pp. 229-238. 
41 For details regarding the movies Dacii and Mihai Viteazul, see MODORCEA, Grid, ed., Dicţionarul 
filmului românesc de ficţiune (Dictionary of the Romanian feature film), Bucharest, Editura Cartea 
Românescă, 2004, pp. 164-65 and, respectively, 198-99. On the process of nation-building in communist 
Romania, see PETRESCU, Dragoş: “Communist Legacies in the ‘New Europe.’ History, Ethnicity, and the 
Creation of a ‘Socialist’ Nation in Romania, 1945-1989,” in Konrad H. JARAUSCH and Thomas LIN-
DENBERGER, (eds.): Conflicted Memories: Europeanizing Contemporary Histories, New York, Berghahn 
Books, 2007, pp. 37-54. On the rankings devised by the National Centre of Cinematography regarding the 
most watched Romanian movies of all times see “Cele mai vizionate filme româneşti din toate timpurile” 
(The most watched Romanian movies of all time) in Cotidianul (Bucharest), 23 August 2005; Internet; 
http://cotidianul.ro/cele_mai_vizionate_filme_romanesti_din_toate_timpurile-2116.html; accessed 29 July 
2008. Mihai Viteazul was watched by 13,330,000 persons while Dacii was watched by 13,112,000. 
42 CEAUŞESCU: “Cuvîntare la marea adunare populară din municipiul Cluj – 30 august 1968” 
(Speech delivered at the mass rally in the city of Cluj – 30 August 1968), in Idem, Reports, speeches, 
articles: January 1968 – March 1969, p. 478. 
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cestors and the manipulation of national symbols became the main ingredients of 
Ceauşescuism.  
Another proof of Ceauşescu’s commitment to pursuing independent policies 
within the Soviet bloc was his public refusal of the Brezhnev Doctrine. Ceauşescu 
made his refusal of the Brezhnev Doctrine plain on 29 November 1968 in the front 
of Romanian Grand National Assembly gathered in a special session to celebrate 
fifty years from the unification of Transylvania with Romania on 1 December 1918. 
In his speech, Ceauşescu resolutely criticized the concept of “limited sovereignty” 
applied to the relations between communist countries: 
 
The thesis that one tries to validate lately, according to which the common 
defense of the socialist countries against an imperialistic attack presupposes 
the limitation or renunciation to the sovereignty of a state participating to the 
[Warsaw] Treaty, does not correspond to the principles characterizing the re-
lations between socialist states and under no circumstances may be accepted. 
The affiliation to the Warsaw Treaty Organization not only that does not 
question the sovereignty of the member states, that does not “limit” in a way 
or another their state independence, but, on the contrary, as the Treaty stipu-
lates, is a means of strengthening the national independence and sovereignty 
of each participating state.43 
 
As a conclusion to this section, it may be argued that the Romanian national-
communism reached full development only in the aftermath of Ceausescu’s “bal-
cony speech” of 21 August 1968 and this is due to the fact that in those days the 
RCP could claim that it was the continuator of the political traditions of the three 
historic Romanian Principalities and it was perceived as such by large segments of 
the population. At the time, the national euphoria was high and not many were able 
to predict that quite soon, i.e., in July 1971, the Ceauşescu regime would return to 
cultural and economic Stalinism44. 
_____________ 
 
43 CEAUŞESCU: “Expunere la şedinţa jubiliară a Marii Adunări Naţionale consacrată sărbătoririi 
semicentenarului unirii Transilvaniei cu România – 29 noiembrie 1968” (Speech delivered at the spe-
cial session of the Grand National Assembly dedicated to the celebration of fifty years since the unifi-
cation of Transylvania with Romania – 29 November 1968), in Idem, Reports, speeches, articles: 
January 1968 – March 1969, pp. 745-746. 
44 The so-called “Theses of July 1971” is a rather brief document structured on seventeen points, 
issued on 6 July 1971, which revealed Ceauşescu’s rigid attitude towards education and cultural pro-
duction. Ceauşescu reiterated the main ideas put forward in the document issued on July 6 at a meeting 
of the Party active in charge with propaganda and indoctrination, held on 9 July 1971. In short, the 
“Theses of July 1971” represented a radical attack against the cosmopolitan and “decadent,” pro-
Western attitudes in Romanian culture, and signaled a return to cultural autochthonism. See 
CEAUŞESCU, Nicolae: Propuneri de măsuri pentru îmbunătăţirea activităţii politico-ideologice, de 
educare marxist-leninistă a membrilor de partid, a tuturor oamenilor muncii – 6 iulie 1971 (Proposals 
of measures aimed at enhancing the political-ideological activity, of Marxist-Leninist education of the 
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Concluding Remarks 
 
The present paper has examined three major aspects related to the reaction of the 
communist leadership in Bucharest to the invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 
1968. First, it has argued that in order to provide a well grounded explanation of 
communist Romania’s official condemnation of the August 1968 WTO intervention 
in Czechoslovakia one should examine the developments in Romanian communism 
over a longer period of time, that is, 1956-1968. As shown above, Ceauşescu’s 
speech of 21 August 1968, which was perceived as a bold gesture of disobedience 
to the Soviet Union, was consistent with the political line adopted by the Romanian 
communist elite in the post-1956 period and its efforts to emancipate their Party 
from Moscow. 
Second, this paper has examined the legitimacy issue and demonstrated that the 
political actions taken by the Romanian communists during the period 1964-1968 
resulted in positive actions expressing consent from the part of large segments of 
the Romanian society. Ceauşescu’s rejection of the Brezhnev Doctrine was per-
ceived domestically as a commitment to reform communism and thus a numerous 
Romanian citizens came to believe that Ceauşescu’s discourse of 21 August 1968 
only marked the beginning of a period of reforms and even more openness towards 
the West. On a background of timid ideological relaxation and slight economic im-
provement, Ceauşescu’s display of national pride and complete independence cre-
ated a special state of mind among the Romanian population and brought him a 
broad popular support, which eventually gave legitimacy to the single-Party rule in 
Romania. Simply put, the Romanian Communist Party managed to achieve a “lim-
ited legitimation through consent”45. 
Third, this paper has addressed the problem of identity politics under Romanian 
communism and demonstrated that the year 1968 marked the transition to a com-
prehensive nation-building project aiming at constructing an ethnically homogenous 
Romanian “socialist” nation. To a large extent, Ceauşescu’s chauvinistic national-
ism developed as a result of the unconditional obedience of the power elite to the 
supreme leader of the Romanian communists and the broad popular support he 
managed to secure for himself in the aftermath of his August 1968 “charismatic 
moment.” 
 
 
_____________ 
 
Party members and the entire working people – 6 iulie 1971) and Expunere la Consfătuirea de lucru a 
activului de partid din domeniul ideologiei şi al activităţii politice şi cultural-educative – 9 iulie 1971 
(Exposé at the Meeting of the Party aktiv in the field of ideology and the political and cultural-
educational activity – 9 July 1971) (Bucharest, Editura Politică, 1971). 
45 As defined by BEETHAM: p. 117. 
